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Gestures serve many roles in communication, learning and understanding both for those who view them and those who
create them. Gestures are especially effective when they bear resemblance to the thought they represent, an advantage
they have over words. Here, we examine the role of conceptually congruent gestures in deepening understanding of
dynamic systems. Understanding the structure of dynamic systems is relatively easy, but understanding the actions of
dynamic systems can be challenging. We found that seeing gestures representing actions enhanced understanding of
the dynamics of a complex system as revealed in invented language, gestures and visual explanations. Gestures can map
many meanings more directly than language, representing many concepts congruently. Designing and using gestures
congruent with meaning can augment comprehension and learning.
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Effective communication, notably teaching, is a central
application of cognitive psychology. Explaining processes
that occur over time is especially challenging, primarily
because of the complexity of the sequence of actions
and their causes and consequences. Adding gestures that
are crafted to congruently represent the actions to the
verbal explanation deepens understanding of the actions
and the system as a whole. Gestures are especially effect-




Mastering dynamic systems is a recurrent task in our
lives. In school, learning the behavior of neurons, the
growth of plants, the behavior of molecules, and the
events leading to the French Revolution; in our everyday
lives, filing income taxes, operating the proverbial VCR,
and using new software; in our public lives, understand-
ing the workings of the electoral college, the behavior of
the stock market, and the actions of the various political
and religious factions in the Middle East. These systems* Correspondence: skang79@wisc.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided you giv
the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifcan be decomposed into parts, the actions of the parts
over time, and the consequences of the actions; hence, the
term “dynamic systems.” Grasping some dynamic systems
is difficult because the systems are not thoroughly under-
stood or probabilistic, but even well-understood dynamic
systems are challenging. Dynamic systems ordinarily have
one or more structural layers and one or more layers of
action. Structural layers consist of a set of parts, typically
with specific associated properties, and their inter-
relations. Layers of action, behavior, process or causality
consist of sequences of kinds of actions and their conse-
quences. The structural layer is static, and if only for that
reason, is easier to understand. The action layer is dy-
namic; it consists of changes in time, specifically, a se-
quence of varying actions and outcomes that are the
consequences of the actions, often accompanied by causal
reasons. Smart undergraduates who happen to score
below the median in a test of mechanical ability—that is
half the undergraduates—have difficulties understanding
the behavior of dynamic systems, even relatively simple
ones like the workings of a car brake or bicycle pump or
pulley system, though they readily grasp the structure of
the system parts (e.g., Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004;
Tversky, Heiser, & Morrison, 2013). Understanding the
behavior of dynamic systems entails comprehending the
temporal sequence of the actions of the parts of the sys-
tem, the nature of the actions, the changes that result, andis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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changes.
Representing dynamic systems in graphics
The structural levels of dynamic systems, a configuration
of parts, can be readily mapped to diagrams and that is, in
fact, a common approach to representing them. Putting
concepts into the world in the form of sketches, models,
diagrams, artifacts and the like is well-known to promote
memory, thinking and learning (e.g., Card, Mackinlay &
Shneiderman, 1999; Hegarty, 2011; Larkin & Simon, 1987;
Mayer, 2005; Schon, 1983; Tufte, 1983; Tversky, 2001,
2011). For simplicity, let us call the various forms of exter-
nalizing thought graphics. Putting and arranging thought
in the world using graphics can spatialize that information
as well as expand memory and promote information
processing. Importantly, the ways that elements are
shown and spatially arranged can abstract and structure
thought more directly and congruently than language.
The parts of a system that are close or interacting can
be shown as close and interacting. The parts and whole
can be depicted, as can some kinds of actions. Se-
quences of actions can be indicated by arrows. Repre-
senting the objects and arrangements of thought in the
world provides a platform for inference and discovery
(e.g., Tversky, 2011).
Representing change over time in graphics
Graphics are for the most part static; they can stay in
front of the eyes to be contemplated. Yet, exactly be-
cause graphics are static, conveying dynamic systems
that entail action, process, behavior, or change in time,
has proved challenging for graphics.
Several solutions have been devised to convey dynamic
information in graphics, including arrows, successive still
diagrams and animated diagrams; none have proved to
be universally satisfactory. As noted, a common and
often successful solution is to use arrows. People readily
produce and interpret arrows as temporal and/or causal
relations (e.g., Heiser & Tversky, 2006). However, arrows
can be ambiguous because they have a multitude of uses
in diagrams. They can be used to label, to indicate tem-
poral sequence, to indicate movement, to indicate causal
connection, to show invisible forces, and more (e.g.,
Tversky, 2011). Many diagrams in the social sciences,
biological and physical sciences, and engineering use
arrows in multiple ways without disambiguating their
meanings, resulting in diagrams that can be confusing and
difficult to comprehend (Tversky, Heiser, MacKenzie,
Lozano, & Morrison, 2007). In addition, showing the
qualitative properties of important kinds of actions, such
as forming alliances or chemical bonding or explosions or
condensation, takes more than arrows. Another common
method to show change in time is a sequence of stilldiagrams; however, successive stills also have limitations.
Like arrows, they cannot readily show qualitative aspects
of actions. In addition, they require integrating the separ-
ate still diagrams in turn, not an easy task. The separate
diagrams must be compared by eye, and the changes be-
tween them imagined. Yet another way to convey action is
by animations. Animations are especially compelling
because they are conceptually congruent with what they
convey: they use change in time to convey change in time
(Tversky, Morrison, & Betrancourt, 2002). However, a
broad survey comparing animated and still graphics relay-
ing the same information and designed to educate viewers
about complex processes that occur over time showed no
benefits from animated graphics (Tversky et al., 2002).
Three reasons were proposed for the failure to find
benefits of animated over static graphics for conveying
processes in time. One reason for the lack of success of
animated educational graphics is perceptual, too much
happens at the same time, so it is hard to grasp the se-
quence and nature of the changes. Another shortcoming
of most educational animations is that they do not break
the changes into their natural units. Instead, they show
change in time continuously, proportionate to real time.
The explanations that teachers and lay people in general
provide are not continuous in time and proportionate to
real time. Instead, explanations provided by people gener-
ally break processes into natural steps. Here is a simple
example: when explaining routes, people segment them as
a sequence of turns at landmarks (Denis, 1997; Tversky &
Lee, 1998). Similarly, in describing actions that are con-
tinuous in time, like doing the dishes or making a bed,
people segment the actions into discrete steps and sub-
steps by accomplishment of goals and subgoals, not by
time per se (e.g., Tversky, Zacks, & Hard, 2008). Anima-
tions typically fail to segment processes into their natural
steps. Finally, showing is not explaining. Animations can
show some changes, but in and of themselves do not
explain the causal connections. In fact, animations accom-
panied by explanations can improve understanding when
compared with animations without explanations (e.g.,
Mayer, 2005).
The roles of gesture in expressing and understanding
thought
An underused and understudied possibility for effectively
explaining dynamic systems is to use gestures. Gestures
are actions; they should be natural for conveying actions
(e.g., Cartmill, Beilock, & Goldin-Meadow, 2012; Hostetter
& Alibali, 2008). Numerous studies have shown that
people spontaneously gesture when explaining to them-
selves or to others (e.g., Alibali, Bassok, Solomon, Syc, &
Goldin-Meadow, 1999; Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita,
2011; Atit, Gagnier, & Shipley, 2014; Cartmill et al., 2012;
Chu & Kita, 2011; Emmorey, Tversky, & Taylor, 2000;
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Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010; Goldin-Meadow &
Alibali, 1999; Goldin-Meadow, Kim, & Singer, 1999;
Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001;
Gukson, Goldin-Meadow, Newcombe, & Shipley, 2013;
Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Kang, Tversky, & Black, 2014;
Schwartz & Black, 1996). In many cases, gestures carry
information that is not carried in speech. Considerable
research has shown that information carried solely by
gesture can facilitate learning, thinking and under-
standing in both children and adults in a broad range
of tasks including conservation (e.g., Church, Ayman-
Nolley, & Mahootian, 2004; Ping & Goldin-Meadow,
2008), word learning (McGregor, Rohlfing, Bean, &
Marschner, 2009), problem solving (Beilock & Goldin-
Meadow, 2010; Singer & Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Tversky
& Kessell, 2014), sentence memory (Thompson, Driscoll,
& Markson, 1998), asymmetry (Valenzeno, Alibali, &
Klatzky, 2003), math (e.g., Alibali & DiRusso, 1999; Cook,
Duffy, & Fenn, 2013; Cook & Goldin-Meadow, 2006;
Goldin-Meadow et al., 1999; Segal, Tversky, & Black,
2014), math analogies (Richland & McDonough, 2010),
cyclical and simultaneous time (Jamalian & Tversky,
2012), story understanding (Beattie & Shovelton, 1999),
and more.
Gestures can represent and resemble action
Gestures are frequently produced spontaneously to ex-
press both structure and action (e.g., Atit et al., 2014;
Cartmill et al., 2012; Chu & Kita, 2011; Emmorey et al.,
2000; Enfield, 2003; Engle, 1998; Goldin-Meadow &
Beilock, 2010; Gukson et al., 2013; Kang et al., 2014). In
previous research showing effects of communicative
gestures that convey actions, the gestures used have
been single actions on visible objects, such as lifting a
disk (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010), counting (Carlson,
Avraamides, Cary, & Strasberg, 2007) or rotating an imag-
ined object (Alibali et al., 2011; Chu & Kita, 2011; Schwartz
& Black, 1996). The present research examines the role of
an integrated sequence of gestures representing a sequence
of actions on named rather than instantiated objects. In
order to convey structure, action, or other concepts, ges-
tures must be custom-crafted to represent the specific
content. Like effective graphics, effective gestures should be
congruent with the meanings they express. As for graphics,
gestures can map meanings more directly than language. A
sequence of pointing gestures in gesture space can map the
relative spatial locations of landmarks in an environment,
much like a schematic map (Emmorey et al., 2000). A circ-
ling gesture is a more direct and congruent representation
of circling motion than the word “circling.” Gestures are
themselves actions and can be three-dimensional so can
represent complex manners of action more directly cer-
tainly than words and in many cases also more directlythan flat diagrams or animations. Note that in these con-
gruent mappings of meaning, the gestures both represent
the concept to be conveyed and resemble the concept to be
conveyed. Both the word “circling” and a circular motion of
the finger represent circling motion but only the circular
motion resembles circling. A circling gesture can be more
readily apprehended than a word, which is an arbitrary
mapping of meaning to sound requiring knowledge of the
language.
Neuroscience and action
Gesture, then, should have a special role in representing
action for explanations and understanding. Gestures are
spontaneously used to convey action and gestures can
both represent and resemble actions. Neuroscience re-
search also shows connections between thought, action
and gesture. Watching actions performed by others, es-
pecially well-known actions, has been shown to activate
regions of the brain involved in planning or making
actions, a phenomenon known as motor resonance (e.g.,
Decety et al., 1997; Iacoboni, Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Molenberghs, Cunnington, &
Mattingly, 2012; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti,
Fogasse, & Gallese, 2001; Utihol, van Rooij, Bekkering, &
Haselager, 2011). The general view is that this kind of
motor mirroring serves action understanding. Seeing ac-
tion gestures, then, should induce motor resonance,
adding a layer of meaning and understanding of action.
This analysis suggests that gestures showing a sequence
of actions could deepen understanding of the actions of a
dynamic system, the goal of the present study. After con-
sidering previous research and extensive pretesting, we
selected the four-stroke engine typically found in automo-
biles as a test platform. Previous research has used mech-
anical systems such as a bicycle pump, a pulley system or
car brake, or biological systems such as the heart (e.g.,
Mayer, 2005). However, these systems do not have many
differentiated actions or are already familiar to many un-
dergraduates. An engine has several different kinds of in-
tegrated actions and is more complex and less known
than the systems typically studied. Yet, it does not assume
the background knowledge required in studies of chemis-
try, biology or physics. In the present study, students
viewed one of two videos explaining the behavior of an en-
gine accompanied by one of two types of gesture. The text
of the explanation was exactly the same for both condi-
tions and both videos were accompanied by the same rudi-
mentary diagram of the engine showing the named parts
in the proper configuration. In the action-gesture video,
the explanation was accompanied by gestures that por-
trayed the actions of each part of the system, for example,
opening, closing, expelling, exploding, igniting, compres-
sing, reducing, letting in, rotating, descending, going in,
going up, and going out. In the structure-gesture video,
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number of gestures that portrayed the structure of
each part of the system, for example, the crankshaft,
the cylinder, the intake valve, the piston, the spark
plug and the exhaust valve. In pretesting, two view-
ings of the video resulted in only chance performance
on the knowledge test but four viewings led to a rea-
sonable level of comprehension, above chance but not
perfect, similar to previous work on learning complex
environments (e.g., Taylor & Tversky, 1992).
Understanding was evaluated in several ways: by ques-
tions about structure and action that could be answered
solely from the text, by student-created visual explana-
tions and by student-created oral explanations to peers.
We were especially interested in the students’ creations,
their visual explanations and oral explanations because
these require both understanding the information and
reformulating it. If seeing action gestures creates a deeper
understanding of action, those who viewed them should
represent more action in their diagrams and include more
action information in their verbal explanations by using
more action words and more action gestures. Because
structure is typically easier to learn than action and be-
cause both groups viewed a rudimentary diagram of struc-
ture, little or no benefit was expected from seeing the
structure gestures.Method
Participants
Fifty-nine (15 male) university students ranging in age
from 20 to 36 years with an average age of 26 (SD = 3.50)
participated in the study. All were native English speakers
with no technology or engineering background and none
had prior knowledge of the system to be learned. The
study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
(IRB) and all participants signed the stipulated informed
agreement.Fig. 1 Still shots from the action (a) and structure (b) videos showing
for participantsMaterials
We created two videos explaining how a four-stroke en-
gine works with the help of a professional video produ-
cer. The videos were identical in language and number
of gestures but differed in kinds of gestures. A rudimen-
tary diagram showing the labels of the parts in their
proper configuration was superimposed in front and to
the side of the speaker. The explanations began with an
introduction overviewing the structure using deictic ges-
tures that pointed to the named parts. The core portion of
the explanation was a step-by-step explanation of the pro-
cesses comprising the workings of the system. The final
portion of the explanation explained how the process
caused the car’s wheels to rotate. Because the diagram
showing the structure was always in view and because the
introduction to both explanations overviewed the system
structure, the gestures exemplifying structure served pri-
marily as a control and were not expected to affect per-
formance on the questions. For the core portion of the
explanation, in the action video the speaker used gestures
that portrayed the action of each part. In the structure
video the speaker used only gestures that pointed to the
location of the parts of the system and showed the shape
of each part as the process was explained. The accom-
panying verbal script (Appendix 1) explained both the lo-
cations of the parts and the actions of the parts identically.
Figure 1 shows snapshots of the two instructional videos.
The information in the script was categorized as struc-
ture or action, and gestures appropriate for each were
devised. For the action gesture video, the explainer showed
the rotational motion of the crankshaft, the direction of
the piston’s movement, the flow of fuel and air, the move-
ment of the intake and exhaust valves, and so on with his
hands. The action gestures were timed with the verbs
describing the actions. The action gestures corresponded
spatially with the approximate locations of the correspond-
ing parts so that the action gestures naturally included
some rudimentary information about overall structure.the superimposed diagrams. The speaker’s head was not blurred
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hand(s) to show the successive shapes of the crankshaft,
piston and cylinder, and showed the positions of the pis-
ton, crankshaft, spark plug, intake port, intake value, ex-
haust port, exhaust valve, and mixture of fuel and air.
The structure gestures were timed with the names of the
described parts and located appropriately.
To eliminate any biasing effects of lexical stress
(van Heuven, 1988; Field, 2005), the explainer prac-
ticed the script several times, making sure to stress the ac-
tions and the parts for both videos. The action gesture
video took 3 min 29 s and the structure gesture video took
3 min 32 s.Knowledge assessments
The verbal knowledge test (Appendix 2) was based
solely on the information in the script. It had 20 recog-
nition questions, 16 True/False, and 4 multiple-choice
questions, each worth 1 point. Of the 16 True/False
questions, 8 queried action and 8 queried structure. Ac-
tion questions referred to movement, or causal rela-
tions of the parts and their consequences. Structure
questions referred to shapes and positions of the parts
of the system. Four multiple-choice questions queried
general knowledge. The questions were presented in
random order. A second assessment was a diagram-
ming task. Participants were asked to create a visual ex-
planation of how a four-stroke engine works based on
what they learned from the video. Finally, participants
made a video to explain the workings of the four-stroke
engine to a peer.Procedure
The participants were seated at a table in front of a lap-
top computer with a 15.4-inch screen. They were ran-
domly assigned to either the action gesture or the
structure gesture condition. The participants were then
told: “Today, your job is to watch a video of how a four-
stroke engine works four times in a row and explain the
concept in the video to a peer coming later. However,
since you are not directly explaining a concept, your ex-
planation will be videotaped and showed later either to
him or her. He or she will learn about the concept from
your explanation.” The participants were not allowed to
take notes or to pause or stop the video. The experi-
menter left the room while the participants watched the
video. After watching the video four times, the partici-
pants were given the verbal knowledge test and the dia-
gramming task, and then made a video explaining the
system to a peer. The video camera was set opposite the
participant 3 m away. Participants were allowed to spend
as much time as they wanted carrying out this task.Gesture coding
Gestures that conveyed relevant semantic content were
coded and analyzed. A gesture was defined as a movement
of hand(s) accompanied by speech to express an idea or
meaning. A gesture unit was defined as “the period of time
between successive rests of the limbs (McNeill, 1992).”
Movement of the hand(s) starting from a resting position
and returning to a resting position was regarded as one
gesture. If the hands did not return to a resting position
between two gestures, the boundary was defined by a
pause in motion and an obvious change in shape or trajec-
tory. When a participant used both hands simultaneously
to describe one object, concept, or part, it was regarded as
one gesture. If a participant used both hands and one de-
scribed an object, a concept, or a part and the other hand
a different concept, the gestures were coded as two differ-
ent gestures. Beats, which serve to advance the discourse,
and emblems, which have conventionalized meanings like
“OK,” were excluded as were a very small number of
metaphoric gestures expressing abstract ideas.
Participants’ gestures were categorized in two ways.
Gestures were coded as imitated when the hand shapes
were the same as the viewed gestures or invented when
the hand shapes differed. The semantic content of the
gestures was coded as action or structure depending on
the properties of the engine they exemplified. Action
gestures showed the action of a part or a process of a
system. They were frequently schematic, showing only
the direction of the action. Structure gestures showed
the position or structure of a part, for example, showing
the contour of a part or pointing to relative position of a
part. Blends, where a gesture carried both action and
structure information, were coded as an action gesture.
Blends were always invented gestures.
Interrater reliability was assessed on a randomly se-
lected set of 240 gestures (18 %) by a second coder
who was trained and blind to the experimental design.
Cohen’s kappa agreement for categorizing gestures was
0.97 (p < .01) for action and structure gesture, and 0.66
(p < .01) for categorizing gestures into invented and
imitated. Discrepancies were resolved by discussion.
Speech coding
Participants’ verbal descriptions were segmented into prop-
ositions (i.e., the unit of meaning in a sentence). The infor-
mation units were coded as action, structure or other.
Most propositions with “is-a” or “has-a” were coded as
structure. For example, “…on each side there are two
valves…” was coded as one structure information unit.
Propositions containing action verbs, either by or on a part,
were coded as action. Additionally, propositions with “has-
a” or “is-a” were coded as action if the argument was about
action, for example, “…that’s one half cycle rotation…” was
coded as action but “…there is the compression phase…”
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phase is of structure.
Other information included greetings, such as “Good
evening,” introductory information such as “I’m going to
explain how a four-stroke engine works,” and meta-
comments such as “…let me tell you a little bit more
about each stage….”
Interrater reliability was assessed on a randomly se-
lected set of 570 speech information units (22 %) by a
second coder who was trained and blind to the experi-
mental design. Cohen’s kappa agreement for categorizing
information units was 0.78 (p < .01).
Results
Knowledge test
An item analysis of the knowledge test revealed that one
of the eight action questions and one of the eight struc-
ture questions had low reliability with the remaining
questions and were not pure action or structure, but re-
lied on knowledge of both. The action question was: “A
byproduct of air and fuel is pushed by a piston and goes
out through an exhaust port,” and the structure question
was: “The piston is located closer to the crankshaft in
the combustion phase than in the exhaust phase.” Those
items were deleted so that performance was analyzed for
seven action questions and seven structure questions;
the means appear in Fig. 2. Overall performance was
good. The action group (mean (M) = 6.03, SD = 1.12)
performed better on the action questions than the struc-
ture group (M = 5.40, SD = 1.28), F(1,57) = 4.12, mean
squared error (MSE) = 1.44, p < .05, η2p ¼ :07. There were
no group differences on the structure questions between
the action group (M = 5.21, SD = 1.37) and the structure
group (M = 5.33, SD = 1.37) (p = .73). Likewise, there was
no group difference between the action group (M = 13.93,Fig. 2 Mean scores in the knowledge test. Error bars represent
standard errors of the meansSD = 2.28) and the structure group (M = 13.33, SD = 2.80)
in total scores that included the general knowledge ques-
tions in addition to the questions about structure and ac-
tion (p = .37) and no interaction between group and
question type, F(1,114) = 2.57, p = .11.Visual explanations
Examples of diagrams that participants produced in creat-
ing visual explanations are shown in Figs. 3 and 4. The di-
agrams were analyzed for inclusion of four key visual
components that reflected action and structure informa-
tion. The experimenter and another coder blind to condi-
tions coded all the diagrams and resolved any differences
by discussion. The components and reliability were as
follows: action arrow, kappa = 0.63 (p < .01); action ef-
fect, kappa = 0.65 (p < .01); labeling arrow, kappa = 0.60
(p < .01); labeling line, kappa = 0.73 (p < .01). Action ar-
rows showed movement, for example, of a part or the flow
of a mixture of air and fuel. Action effects were depictions
of actions, such as ignition, explosion or compression as
in the bubbles and jagged circle in Fig. 3. Labeling arrows
or lines connected names with the corresponding depic-
tion of a part as in Fig. 4.
Poisson regression analyses were used to model count
variables under the assumption that the conditional
means equal the conditional variances. The means of the
diagram components by gesture condition appear in
Fig. 5. Those who watched action gestures produced
more visual components (M = 18.38, SD = 11.36) than those
who viewed structure gestures (M = 15.77, SD = 10.87),
(χ2(1, N = 59) = 7.26, p < .05). They also produced more ac-
tion arrows (M = 7.48, SD = 7.51) than the structure group
(M = 5.77, SD = 6.02), (χ2(1, N = 59) = 6.90, p < .05) as well
as more action effects (M = 2.28, SD = 2.05) than the struc-
ture group (M = 1.37, SD = 1.71), (χ2(1, N = 59) = 1.99,
p < .05). By contrast, the structure group produced
more labeling lines (M = 2.77, SD = 3.56) than the ac-
tion group (M = 1.52, SD = 3.81), (χ2 (1, N = 59) = 7.04,
p < .01). No differences were observed in the number of
labeling arrows (p = .44). Thus, effects of the viewed
gestures were apparent in the diagrams. Those who saw
action gestures showed far more action in their diagrams
in the form of arrows showing direction of movement and
depictions of actions. Conversely, those who saw structure
gestures used more lines to label parts.Completeness of visual explanations
Participants’ visual explanations were analyzed for com-
pleteness. Diagrams were coded as complete if they in-
cluded all four steps of the process and incomplete
otherwise. The names of the steps alone did not count as
complete. Those who had seen action gestures produced
more complete diagrams (25 out of 29) that included all
Fig. 3 Visual explanation of a participant who saw action gestures
Fig. 4 Visual explanation of a participant who saw structure gestures
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of 30), χ2(1, N = 59) = 4.07, p < .05.
Videoed explanations
The participants’ videoed explanations were analyzed for
gesture and language. One video was not recorded dueFig. 5 Mean number of visual component types produced in visual
explanations by viewed gestures. Error bars represent standard errors
of the means
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action group and three from the structure group never
used their hands but were included in the analyses be-
cause not producing gestures is a behavioral pattern, if
an infrequent one. The average explanation time was
177.14 s (SD = 56.84) for the action group and 152.34 s
(SD = 55.94) for the structure group, a difference that did
not reach significance (p = .10). Even though they had seen
the same number of gestures, those who had viewed
action gestures produced more gestures (M = 26.55,
SD = 19.09) than those who had viewed structure
gestures (M = 20.00, SD = 16.09), (χ2(1, N = 58) = 13.34,
p < .01). Figure 6 shows the mean numbers of gestures
of each type by viewed gesture.
Produced gestures were coded as action or structure.
An example of each appears in Fig. 7.
Irrespective of viewing condition, participants produced
more action gestures than structure gestures. Participants
who had viewed action gestures produced an average of
21.62 (SD = 15.21) action gestures and an average of
4.93 (SD = 5.28) structure gestures. Those who had
viewed structure gestures produced an average of
12.90 (SD = 11.79) action gestures and an average of
7.10 (SD = 6.67) structure gestures. A split-plot analysis
of variance (ANOVA) analysis revealed that there was
an interaction between viewed gesture and produced
gesture, F(1,56) = 13.16, MSE = 65.44, p < .01, η2p ¼ :19.
Although the differences in explanation time were not
significant, explanations by participants who had viewed
action gestures were on average longer. Therefore, the
analyses were repeated on gesture rate. The same find-
ings emerged. Those who had viewed action gestures
produced 7.00 (SD = 4.15) action gestures per minute
and 1.51 (SD = 1.41) structure gestures per minute.Fig. 6 Mean number of action and structure gestures produced by
viewed gesture. Error bars represent standard errors of the meansThose who had viewed structure gestures produced of
4.87 (SD = 3.55) action gestures per minute and 2.62
(SD = 2.41) structure gestures per minute. A split-plot
ANOVA analysis revealed an interaction between viewed
and produced gestures; those who had viewed action
gestures produced action gestures at a higher rate and
those who had viewed structure gestures had produced
structure gestures at a higher rate, F(1,56) = 11.13,
MSE = 6.81, p < .01, η2p ¼ :17.
Combining both groups, we found that gesture use cor-
related with number of visual components in the diagrams
and with scores on the knowledge test, evidence that bet-
ter understanding is also expressed visually, in gestures
and diagrams. The number of action gestures correlated
with number of action arrows (r = .280, p < .05) and with
number of action effects (r = .282, p < .05) in the visual
explanations. Knowledge test scores were marginally
correlated with frequency of action gestures (r = .234,
p = .078), but not with frequency of structure gesture
(r = −.036, p = .791).Invented and imitated gestures
Most of the gestures participants produced were inven-
tions, not imitations of what they had seen. In commu-
nicative situations, gesture mimicry is common (e.g.,
Holler & Wilkin, 2011; Mol, Krahmer, Maes, & Swerts,
2012). Thus, invented gestures are especially indicative
of deep understanding because they are creations of the
individuals from their own understanding rather than
copies of what they viewed. Any structural gestures pro-
duced by those who viewed the action gesture video and
any action gestures produced by those who viewed the
structure gesture video were a-priori invented. Also, any
additional action gestures produced by those who viewed
action gestures, or additional structural gestures pro-
duced by those who viewed structure gestures, were
coded as invented. Finally, gestures that used different
hand shapes from those that had been viewed were
coded as invented. For example, the speaker in panel (a)
of Fig. 7 described a piston moving up. This gesture was
coded as imitated because in the action instructional
video the speaker spread his right hand with the palm
up and moved it upward in the same way. In contrast,
the participant in Fig. 8 represented the same action of
the piston but with a different hand shape; in addition
she portrayed a piston with her left hand and a rod with
her right hand which connects the crankshaft and a pis-
ton, pushing the piston up.
Gestures similar in hand shape to those viewed were
coded as imitated. The frequencies of invented and imi-
tated gestures are shown in Fig. 9. Those who saw action
gestures produced 19.97 (SD = 14.96) invented gestures
and 6.76 (SD = 5.74) imitated gestures on average. Those
Fig. 7 Examples of gestures produced in videoed explanations. The left panel shows a participant making an action gesture; the right panel
shows a participant making a structure gesture
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(SD = 14.58) invented gestures and 4.38 (SD = 5.93)
imitated gestures on average.
No interaction was found between gesture viewed
and gesture produced (p = .62). Participants produced
more invented than imitated gestures, χ2(1, N = 58) = 9.26,
p < .01. Those who had viewed action gestures produced
both more invented (χ2(1, N = 58) = 12.35, p < .01) and
more imitated gesture (χ2(1, N = 58) = 6.45, p < .01) than
those who had viewed structure gestures.
Analyses of gesture rate corroborated most of these
findings. Those who had viewed action gestures produced
an average of 6.43 (SD = 4.18) invented gestures per mi-
nute and an average of 2.14 (SD = 1.74) imitated gestures
per minute. Those who had viewed structure gestures pro-
duced an average of 5.80 (SD = 4.10) invented gestures per
minute and an average of 1.76 (SD = 2.52) imitated ges-
tures per minute. There were no differences in gesture
rate by viewed gesture. Across conditions, participants
produced more invented gestures than imitated gestures,Fig. 8 An invented gesture demonstrating a piston moving up
(cf. Figs. 1a and 7a)t(57) = 7.26, p < .01, d = 1.27. There was no interaction
between viewed and produced gesture types (p = .83)
nor did two groups differ in invented gesture per mi-
nute (p = .57) and imitated gesture per minute (p = .51).
Speech analysis
Supporting the claims that action information is both
more important and harder to convey, of the total of
2550 information units in the speech corpus, 1607 con-
veyed action, 737 conveyed structure, and 206 conveyed
other information. Those who had viewed action ges-
tures produced a total of 1425 information units, 929
conveying action, 387 conveying structure, and 109 con-
veying other information. Those who had viewed struc-
ture gestures produced a total of 1125 information units,
678 conveyed action, 350 conveyed structure, and 97
conveyed other information. Figure 10 shows the mean
types of information produced by those who had viewed
action and structure gestures. Poisson regression analysisFig. 9 Average invented and imitated gestures by gesture type and
viewed gesture. Error bars represent standard errors of the means
Fig. 10 Mean number of information units by information type in
the two groups. Error bars represent standard errors of the means
Fig. 11 Mean percentage of information units by the two groups.
Error bars represent standard errors of the means
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of speech, χ2(2, N = 58) = 6.55, p < .05. Those who had
viewed action conveyed relatively more action informa-
tion in their speech than those who viewed structure
gestures. That interaction held when other information
was excluded from the analysis, χ2 (2, N = 58) = 5.76,
p < .05. The frequency of producing the various infor-
mation types differed, χ2 (2, N = 58) = 905.11, p < .01.
Overall, participants spoke more about action than about
structure (p < .01), and more about structure than other
(p < .01).Proportion of information type in speech
Because those who had viewed action gestures produced
more speech, the proportions of action, structure, and
other information units were analyzed by viewed gesture;
the means appear in Fig. 11.
A univariate ANOVA corroborated a higher percent of
action information, F(2, 168) = 348.23, p < .01, η2p ¼ :81 .
Post-hoc (Tukey’s HSD) confirmed this; more action infor-
mation was conveyed than structure and other information
units (p < .01), and more structure information was con-
veyed than other information units (p < .01). A split-plot
ANOVA was administered and showed that viewed ges-
ture and speech information interacted, F(2, 112) = 3.44,
MS = 190.11, p < .05, η2p ¼ :06 . Those who had viewed
action gestures spoke relatively more about action
than those who had viewed structure gestures; simi-
larly, those who had viewed structure gestures spoke
relatively more about structure. When other infor-
mation was excluded, the same interaction held be-
tween viewed gesture and type of information produced,
F(1, 56) = 4.37, MSE = 288.10, p < .05, η2p ¼ :07.Discussion
Dynamic systems are pervasive in our lives, but are often
difficult to understand. Dynamic systems typically have a
structural layer, the parts and their interrelations, as well
as a dynamic layer, the actions, changes, behaviors, pro-
cesses, consequences and causes that occur over time.
The structural layer is normally easier to convey and
easier to comprehend than the dynamic layer. The struc-
tural layer is static but the dynamic layer can include
many different kinds of actions and contingencies or con-
sequences. Here, we asked whether accompanying expla-
nations of dynamic systems with a sequence of gestures
that represent the actions of the parts of the system could
enhance understanding of the dynamics of the system.
One group of students watched an explanation accompan-
ied by gestures representing the actions of the parts;
another group of students watched the same verbal ex-
planation but accompanied by gestures showing the forms
of the parts and their spatial array. The verbal explanation
was the same for both explanations. Both types of gestures
are common in spontaneous explanations. A schematic
diagram of the spatial array of the names of the parts ac-
companied both explanations.
Viewing gestures representing action, as opposed to ges-
tures conveying structure in explanations of dynamic sys-
tems, had profound effects on participants’ understanding
of the dynamics of the system. The deeper understanding
of the dynamics of the system was expressed in many
ways; first, in better performance on questions about the
action of the system, questions that could be answered
solely from the shared verbal script. Even more revealing,
the deeper understanding was expressed in students’ own
creations, in their sketched visual explanations of the sys-
tem and in their videoed explanations of the system. The
Kang and Tversky Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:4 Page 11 of 15deeper understanding was revealed in their diagrams, in
their words, and in their own invented gestures. The vis-
ual explanations of those who had seen action gestures
contained more arrows indicating direction of movement;
they also contained more depictions of the various actions,
such as explosion or ignition. These features were neither
in the viewed diagram nor in the video; they derived from
participants’ own understanding; they derived, if you will,
from their mental models of the system.
Importantly, seeing action gestures provided participants
with more complete and comprehensive understandings
of the system. The visual explanations revealed that far
more of those who had seen action gestures distinguished
and included all four stages of the system than those who
had viewed structure gestures.
In their own oral explanations, participants from both
groups devoted three times as many words and three
times as many gestures to explaining the dynamics of
the system as to explaining the structure. This is dra-
matic evidence that the dynamics of a complex system
require more explanation than the structure.
Deeper understanding of the system dynamics was evi-
dent in the oral explanations of the systems by partici-
pants who had seen action gestures. Their explanations
contained more words expressing action, despite having
heard the same words as those who had viewed gestures
conveying structure. Both groups accompanied their ex-
planations with many gestures, more for action than for
structure. The majority of gestures produced by partici-
pants in both groups were inventions by the participants.
The gestures produced had different forms (hand shapes)
from those they had seen; that is, they were not close cop-
ies of viewed gestures. Those invented gestures can be
regarded as synonyms rather than quotes and constitute
evidence that they derived from participants’ deep under-
standings rather than from superficial memory of what
they had seen.
Overall, the results demonstrate far-reaching effects of
action gestures on understanding. Because the language
was the same for both groups, gesture affects under-
standing over and beyond language. Watching an ex-
planation of a dynamic system accompanied by gestures
representing the sequence of actions led to deeper un-
derstanding of the dynamics of the system compared to
seeing gestures representing the structure of the parts.
The deeper understanding was reflected in a better grasp
of the stages of the system, better performance on ques-
tions about the dynamics of the system, and more action
information expressed in diagrams, words and invented
gestures. Gestures conveying structure had little effect
on understanding structure, nor were any effects ex-
pected. Structural information is easier to grasp than dy-
namic information, and a diagram showing structure
was used in the viewed explanation.Numerous studies have shown that people express in-
formation in gestures that they do not express in speech,
important information about their thinking, including
structure, action, and more (e.g., Bavelas, 1994; Church
& Goldin-Meadow, 1986; Emmorey et al., 2000; Garber,
Alibali, & Goldin-Meadow, 1998; Goldin-Meadow, 2003;
Goldin-Meadow & Alibali, 1999; Heiser, Tversky, &
Silverman, 2004; Jamalian, Giardino, & Tversky, 2013;
Jamalian & Tversky, 2012; Kirsh, 2013). Integrated se-
quences of gestures can create virtual models of complex
spaces or complex sequences of actions (Emmorey et al.,
2000; Heiser et al., 2004; Kang et al., 2014; Kirsh, 2013;
Tversky, Heiser, Lee, & Daniel, 2009; Jamalian et al., 2013).
Here, we transferred gestures for expression to gestures
for teaching and learning; we found that an integrated
series of gestures congruent with action can deepen un-
derstanding of the actions of a dynamic system.
This study is by no means the first to demonstrate the
power of gesture to instill knowledge. Examples abound,
in math (e.g., Cook et al., 2013), word learning (McGregor
et al., 2009), conservation (Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 2008),
understanding symmetry (Valenzeno et al., 2003), under-
standing simultaneity (Jamalian & Tversky, 2012). How-
ever, this is the first demonstration of the efficacy of an
orchestrated sequence of conceptually congruent gestures
to instill deeper understanding of a dynamic system and
to demonstrate that deeper understanding in students’
own words, gestures, and diagrams as well as in a test of
knowledge. A further benefit of gesture is that it is “low-
tech,” nothing more is needed than the tools that we carry
with us at all times, our hands and our bodies.
Expressing knowledge visually by means of gesture bears
similarities to expressing knowledge in graphics. Both
gestures and graphics can abstract, segment, and integrate
information to be conveyed or understood (e.g., Tversky &
Kessell, 2014; Tversky, 2011; Tversky et al., 2009). Dia-
grams are typically multimodal, incorporating and inte-
grating both marks in space, their sizes, formats, and
places in space, and also words, symbols, and more to
create complete messages. So, too, are gestures; they
are typically an integral part of a complete multimodal
message (e.g., Engle, 1998). In much diagrammatic com-
munication—think of maps, science diagrams, assembly
instructions—the visual-spatial features of meaning form
the core of the message; the words and symbols annotate
(e.g., Netz, 1999). There are parallel cases for gesture; that
is, the sequence of gestures form the core of the com-
munication, and the words serve to annotate the gestures
(e.g., Emmorey et al., 2000; Kirsh, 2013). In many in-
stances, the three—gesture, talk, and diagram—work to-
gether, complementing and supplementing each other
(e.g., Engle, 1998; Kang et al., 2014; Heiser et al., 2004).
Examples abound, for example, in sports, dance, musical
instruments, cooking, and more. The present results along
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ating well-crafted gestures and other forms of visual com-
munication in teaching, especially of dynamic systems
that entail actions in time. Dynamic systems are typical of
Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM), but
also other domains such as history.
In most, if not all, cases, the use of gesture to form the
core of messages or to complement, disambiguate, and en-
rich words seems to be because the information is easier
to express and more precise in gesture than it words. In
other words, it is more direct and more natural to show
than to tell. In addition, information about space and ac-
tion is often far more precise in gesture than in words.
Pointing to the exact position of a part of an object can be
more precise that describing the position; showing the
motion of an object can be more precise than describing
the motion. As Talmy (1983, 1988, 2000) analyzed and
others have documented (e.g., Daniel & Tversky, 2012;
Denis, 1997; Tversky & Lee, 1998), words in languages all
over the world schematize information about space and
action in space into rough categories like “close” and “far,”
“here” and “there,” “up” and “down,” “forward” and “back-
ward,” “push” and “pull,” and “turn.” Deictic terms like
“here” or “this way” or “like this” accompanied by a ges-
ture save the many words that would be needed to ad-
equately describe the place or the direction or the manner
of the action. The same word, “lift,” is used whether an
object is heavy or light, but the gestures change (Beilock &
Goldin-Meadow, 2010). Do I push with a finger or a hand
or a handle? With one hand or two? The word “rotate”
does not specify the plane of rotation nor does it specify
the hand position, the strength needed, or whether a tool
is required; gestures can readily do all that. Thus, the
spatial and action information conveyed in gesture disam-
biguates and clarifies information that may be ambiguous
or imprecise in speech, yielding greater accuracy in com-
munication (e.g. Heiser et al., 2004). Just as gestures are
effective in communicating information more precisely
and directly to others, they are also more effective than
words alone in comprehending and communicating infor-
mation for self (e.g., Jamalian et al., 2013).
Many have analyzed the close connections between ges-
ture and action, calling attention to phenomena like motor
resonance (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) and postulat-
ing mediation through them (e.g., Cartmill et al., 2012;
Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008;
Holler & Beattie, 2003; Kirsh, 2013; Kita & Özyürek, 2003;
Tversky & Kessell, 2014). Building on those insightful ana-
lyses, we propose a more direct relationship between ges-
tures and representations of space and action. Concepts of
space and action (and much more) map naturally and
directly to places and actions of the hands and the body
(Cartmill et al., 2012; Tversky, 2011, 2015; Tversky & Kes-
sell, 2014; Tversky et al., 2009). The hands and the bodyboth are in places and act in space and, therefore, can read-
ily represent places and actions in space. This natural map-
ping as well as the increased precision of gesture over
words makes gestures ideal for representing space and ac-
tion both for self and for others. Gestures express meanings
directly and, in some cases, can prime the relevant words
(e.g., Krauss, 1998). Gestures are primary to meaning, not
secondary.
Conclusion
Before there were words, there were gestures, both onto-
genetically and phylogenetically (e.g., Call & Tomasello,
2007). Babies typically gesture before they speak (e.g.,
Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005). In an analysis of the
evolution of language drawing on the neurological basis
of mirror neurons, Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) postulate
that gestures, especially action gestures, grew out of ab-
breviated actions. Given that the same neurons in the
premotor cortex in monkeys fire when monkeys perform
hand actions and view hand actions, abbreviated hand
actions could be used to communicate and understand
intentions to perform specific actions. They further note
that the brain substrate for mirror neurons in monkeys
is homologous with Broca’s area in humans, a region
long known to be involved in language production and
understanding in humans. More recent research in
neuroscience implicates Broca’s area in action under-
standing as well (e.g., Fadiga & Craighero, 2006; Fadiga
et al., 2006). Communication canonically began face-to-
face in small groups. Face-to-face communication occurs
in specific contexts, often around a task or topic related
to the context. Aspects of context can be and are used
in conversations, pointed to, manipulated, and often
given new meanings (e.g., Clark, 1996). As such, face-to-
face communication could and can rely on gestures and
props, using gestures to bring props in the context into
the conversation. In fact, our vocabularies for certain
domains are sparse, crude, abstract and ambiguous, even
for concrete domains central to our existence, faces,
space, and action. Gestures can be more precise and
show more nuances than words. Gestures are actions in
space, and thereby provide a natural and direct mapping
for representing space and action. Gestures are powerful
tools for thinking and communicating because they both
represent and resemble.
Appendix 1: Script for the instructional video
Today, I am going to explain how a four-stroke engine
works. Almost all cars currently use what is called a
four-stroke engine to convert gasoline into motion. A
four-stroke engine to the cycle refers to a series of pro-
cesses including intake, compression, combustion and
exhaust. The series of processes happen inside the cylin-
der, which includes the intake valve, the intake port, the
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ton, the connecting rod and the crankshaft.
Each cycle entails two rotations of the crankshaft for
engines fueled by diesel or gasoline. Understanding the cy-
cle’s four strokes is a key to understanding how the engine
type works. “Four-strokes” to the cycle takes place con-
tinuously as the engine runs. In practice, this cycle hap-
pens one after the next in every cylinder of the engine.
Intake
The beginning of the cycle starts at what is known as
“top dead center.” The first half rotation of the crank-
shaft pulls the piston downward inside the cylinder, re-
ducing pressure inside. As the piston descends, the
intake valve is pulled open, letting in a mixture of forced
fuel and air.
Compression
The second half rotation of the crankshaft pushes the
piston back up again inside the cylinder, compressing
the fuel and air mixture as the intake valve closes.
Combustion
The third half rotation of the crankshaft is known as the
combustion stroke. At the end of the compression stroke,
a spark plug ignites the combustible mixture of fuel and
air. This small explosion pushes the piston downward
again in the cylinder through its power stroke.
Exhaust
The final stroke is known as the exhaust stroke. After
the power stroke, the last half rotation of the crankshaft
pushes the piston upwards in the cylinder for a second
time, expelling the byproduct of the fuel and air com-
bustion. As the crankshaft pushes the piston up, the ex-
haust valve opens, allowing the byproduct to go out.
In this process, the linear motion of the piston is con-
verted into rotational motion by the crankshaft and this
rotational motion is then used to rotate the car’s wheels.
Appendix 2: Knowledge test
*Please choose a correct answer, or mark each of these
statements are true (T) or false (F).
When the intake valve is pulled open, air and fuel
move inside the cylinder. ( )
The crankshaft is attached to the wall of the cylinder. ( )
The piston is above the cylinder. ( )
The byproduct enters the cylinder when the crankshaft
pushes the piston downward. ( )
The exhaust valve is located between the spark plug
and the intake valve. ( )
In the exhaust phase, the piston moves upwards by ro-
tation of the crankshaft. ( )In the compression phase the piston is located closer
to the intake valve than in the intake phase. ( )
From where does a mixture of air and fuel enter the
cylinder? ( )
(1) intake valve (2) intake port (3) cylinder (4) exhaust
valve
In the combustion phase, the mixture of fuel and air
expands when the piston is pushed up within the cy-
linder. ( )
How many spark plugs does the cylinder have in one
cycle? ( )
(1) one (2) two (3) three (4) four
The piston is located closer to the crankshaft m the
combustion phase than in the exhaust phase. ( )
How many times does the crankshaft rotate in each
cycle? ( )
(1) one (2) two (3) three (4) four
The piston is attached to the wall of the cylinder. ( )
A byproduct of air and fuel is pushed by a piston and
goes out through an exhaust port. ( )
The linear motion of the crankshaft makes the car’s
wheels rotate. ( )
A mixture of air and fuel is located above the piston. ( )
In the intake phase, the rotational motion of the
crankshaft pulls the piston downward. ( )
The piston is below the crankshaft. ( )
In which stage does the engine get most of its power? ( )
(1) intake (2) combustion (3) compression (4) exhaust
In the compression phase, the piston is pushed back up
again inside the cylinder. ( )
STOP
Do not turn the page until you are told to do so!
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